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Richard Rufus of Cornwall, who circa 1250 was somewhat grudgingly writing a Commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences, 3 subjecting Anselm's argument to the most trenchant criticism since the monk Gaunilo wrote on behalf of the atheist. 4 Following a fair and succinct restatement of chapters two and three of the Proslogion, 5 Rufus raises the following dubitatio:
These arguments (rationes), although subtle, nevertheless seem sophistical. For that expression (sermo) "quo aliquid maius excogitari non potest" has both a signification (or meaning) and a supposition (or designation); its meaning is in the understanding even of the fool, when he hears it and also thinks it. For how did he say this in his heart unless he thought it?
For it is the same to say in the heart and to think. This meaning that the fool has thought and placed in his heart, however, has no supposition; and thus he can think that what is designated (suppositum) can be thought not to exist. "In one way therefore,"
as Anselm himself says, "the thing is thought, when the word signifying it is thought; in another way when that which the thing is is understood." 6 Thus in the former way (of thinking) one can think that God does not exist, but in the latter way not at all. 7 Thus, to Rufus's way of thinking, Anselm, in attempting to explain the fool, has raised a fatal objection to his own argument and therefore has need of stronger and subtler arguments (fortiores, subtiliores).
These Rufus is more than happy to provide. In a syllogism that he later identifies as being in the fourth mood of the second figure (in Peter of Spain's taxonomy 9 ), he argues as follows:
Therefore, let "that which a greater cannot be thought" be called To summarize: Rufus begins with the hypothesis "TEa," shows that "Ea" follows from this hypothesis, and thus concludes "TEa → Ea," that is, that if a can be thought to exist, then a exists. Moreover, the key move in the argument, showing that "Ea" follows from "TEa,"
involves a syllogism whose form is the fourth of the second figure.
Rufus follows with a second syllogism, of the same figure and mood:
Likewise, if a can be thought at all, it is necessary that a exist. Therefore, let there be another hypothesis, and it is argued as follows. Whatever can be thought and does not exist, if it were to exist, could either in fact or in understanding not exist, because, namely, it could be thought to exist through a beginning; a, if it were to exist, would not be able not to exist either in reality or in the mind, otherwise a would not be a; therefore a cannot be thought and still not exist. If therefore it (that is, a) can be thought, it exists. 14 9
Structurally, this argument is similar to the first, and so a briefer analysis will suffice. Argument 2 is as follows, again with numbers for later reference and with extraneous material italicized.
[2.1] If a can be thought at all, it is necessary that a exist.
[ 
Formalization of Argument 2
Let: a = that than which a greater cannot be thought E = exist TA = can be thought at all FE = in fact exists (that is, exist in reality) 10 UE = in understanding exist TEB = can be thought to exist through a beginning → = it is necessary that Then Rufus's statements are translated as: And again, as we will see below, a syllogism having the form of the fourth of the second figure plays a prominent role. we are dealing with a syllogism whose form is the fourth of the second figure, then this first premise of the syllogism has the form "All B are A." So the category represented by B would be the category of (things that can be thought at all and do not exist). The category represented by A would be the category of (things that, if they exist, do not exist in fact or do not exist in the understanding).
Modern Translation of Argument
Recall that the second premise of this type of syllogism is of the This, then, makes the category represented by C the category of (things that are a).
Finally, then, the conclusion of this type of syllogism, of the form "Some C are not B," would have to be "Some (things that are a)
are not (things that can be thought of at all and do not exist we have a syllogism of the form Rufus suggests.
To summarize: the situation here is almost exactly parallel to Argument 1. Rufus hypothesizes "TAa," shows that "Ea" follows, and thus concludes "TAa → Ea," that is, if a can be thought at all, then a exists. Moreover, an important part of the argument, showing that "Ea"
follows from "TAa," involves a syllogism whose form is the fourth mood of the second figure.
The third argument, which Rufus identifies as being in the fourth mood of the first figure, 15 runs as follows:
Let it be posited that a does not exist and yet that it can be thought. I say the following: whatever can be thought and does not exist, if it were to exist, would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought; a can be thought, and does not exist: therefore a, if it were to exist, would not be that than which a greater could not be thought. Therefore, if a were to exist, a would not be a--which is absurd to say.
16
This argument is a bit odd. On the one hand, this is the easiest of the five arguments to translate directly and cleanly into modern symbolic notation. On the other hand, Rufus appears to be making a basic logical mistake. He is presenting a reductio argument, in which he hypothesizes the opposite of what he wants to prove and attempts to derive a contradiction as follows: "if a were to exist, a would not be a--which is absurd to say."
Using "E" to represent "exists,"in modern form Rufus's claim would be symbolized as "Ea → ~(a = a)." Now, "~(a = a)" is a contradiction, but the conditional statement "Ea → ~(a = a)" is in no way a contradiction. It merely states that if a exists, then a contradiction follows. Moreover, the correct conclusion to make from "Ea → ~(a = a)"
is "~Ea." That is, the only conclusion Rufus can draw at this point is the conclusion that, if the hypothesis he used to begin the proof is correct, then a does not exist.
One more preliminary note on this passage: Rufus says that this argument seems to be in the fourth mood of the third figure. However, we can find no way to reconstruct this passage so that it in any way resembles a syllogism of this form. For that matter, we can find no reconstruction of this passage that resembles any valid syllogism, or any valid argument--syllogistic or not. In short, this is a rather puzzling passage. By far the most clear and unambiguous of all the five arguments, it also seems clearly to be defective.
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With these caveats in mind, we present the reconstruction of Argument 3. As usual, extraneous material is italicized.
[3.1] Let it be posited that a does not exist, and yet that it can be thought.
Formalization of Argument 3
Let: E = exist T = can be thought GNC = greater not conceivable being
[gnc] = name for the being greater than which cannot be conceived (that is, this is the name for the GNC)
Then the premises of Rufus's argument would be formalized as: Again, the above translation seems to be a straightforward translation of the passage from the Rufus text. Note that line 8 is a mistaken inference (because line 7, as noted earlier, is not a contradiction).
Thus lines 8, 9, and 10 do not follow.
To summarize: it is difficult to see this passage as anything other than a substantial logical mistake. From his hypothesis, Rufus seems to believe that he has derived a contradiction, when he has in fact merely derived a conditional statement whose consequent is a contradiction. But such a conditional statement is not contradictory, nor are there any other ingredients in this argument that would enable Rufus to derive the contradiction he needs for his reductio strategy.
Fourthly, Rufus formulates a syllogism which is also the fourth mood of the second figure   18 : Whatever in some place or at some time does not exist, even if it does exist in some place and at some time, can be thought to exist in no place and at no time, and thus can be thought not to exist; a, if it exists, cannot be thought not to exist, for otherwise if a exists, a is not a: therefore, in no place nor at no time does it not exist; therefore, it exists always and everywhere.
19
In this argument Rufus seems to include more extraneous (and thus confusing) phrases than in the earlier arguments. In numbering the lines from the passage, we have omitted what seems to us to be this extraneous material (the ellipses indicate omitted words or phrases).
We use "GNC" to abbreviate "the being greater than which cannot be conceived." For this reconstruction, phrases that are implied but not explicitly stated are in italics.
[4.1] Whatever at any place or at any time does not exist...can be thought not to exist.
[4.2] The GNC, if it exists, cannot be thought not to exist. To summarize: as with Arguments 1 and 2, this argument is clearly valid, that is, the conclusion follows from the basic assumptions of the argument. And as with these earlier arguments, this argument does importantly involve a syllogism whose form, as Rufus indicated, is the fourth mood of the second figure.
Lastly, Rufus provides his fifth and final argument:
Likewise, let someone say that he can think that a does not This is a complex and ambiguously phrased argument. Removing the ambiguities required a longer proof than needed for the previous passages, but eventually the argument is shown to be valid.
Incidentally, Rufus does not indicate that this argument is a syllogistic argument, and indeed it does not appear to be directly translatable into any valid syllogism. As usual, extraneous material in italicized.
[5.1] let someone say that he can think that a does not exist 
Reductio
As with Arguments 1, 2, and 4, Argument 5 is clearly valid, although, as noted, it is a substantially more complex argument and does not appear to have a syllogistic equivalent.
We can see, then, that Rufus's arguments (except the problematic What do we find when we look closely at these basic assumptions?
Well, insists Rufus, even these strengthened and subtler arguments appear to be flawed, in the sense that they do not conclude to God's existence in reality. Why? One could correctly make the claim that "a is not" (that is, "a does not exist") is different from "a is not a".
For whether a exists or does not exist, it remains true that a is a, just as the chimera is the chimera. Therefore the opponent will claim that "a" can indeed be thought not to exist, but "a is not a" cannot be thought.
21
Of course, concedes Rufus, whoever truly sees God (presumably in the next life) would not be able to think that God does not exist, for he would be affirming and denying the same thing, which no intellect can do. For the infinite conditions of the divine essence, argues Rufus, even taken separately are each directly opposed to non-being.
But in this life the fool (that is, the non-believer) is indeed able, as has been said, to think that this divine nature has no The second hypothesis, however, falls victim to the fallacy of accident. Although it appears that the divine nature, which is a substance, namely, "something than which a greater cannot be thought" is opposed to this predicate "able to be thought not to exist"; the 25 predicate in this case is merely an accident, that is an intention, the object as it exists in the knower, to which there is another intention which stands in opposition. 30 This way therefore does not seem to provide a necessary proof that God exists.
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Again, Aquinas in the Summa contra Gentiles makes the very same distinction:
Because given that by this name "God" is understood something than which a greater cannot be thought, it will not be necessary that something than which a greater cannot be thought exist in the nature of things. For it is necessary that a thing and the imposition of its name be posited in the same way. However, from
the fact that what is put forward by this name "God" is conceived in the mind, it does not follow that God exists except in the intellect. Hence it will not be necessary that that than which a greater cannot be thought exist except in the intellect. And from this it does not follow that there be anything in the nature of things than which a greater cannot be thought. And thus those who posit that God does not exist are guilty of no inconsistency, for it is not unreasonable for a person to grant that something greater can be thought either in the mind or in reality, unless that person concedes that there is something in fact than which a greater cannot be thought. 32 Thus, in conclusion, we find in Rufus a thoroughgoing and subtly 13. Although on the face of it this is an odd-sounding way to phrase this, it is a standard way of dealing, in categorical terms, with individual objects.
14. Appendix 7.
15. The fourth mood of the first figure is: "No B are A; some C are B; so some C are not A."
16. Appendix 8.
17. There is also the possibility that the Balliol scribe nodded at this point. Since there is extant only the single witness, there is no chance to check for variant readings. The option comes down to affirming either that Rufus erred or that the
